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Abstract: Contemporary anthropology is developing key perspectives on human
learning that are very relevant for the theories and practices of adult education.
This paper explores the work of Merlin Donald, Donald Mithen, Michael
Tomasello and Tim Ingold to show how current thinking in anthropology
challenges the cognitivist bias that currently dominates our field.
While adult education has drawn broadly on disciplines in the social sciences to help develop
its own distinctive and varied theories and practices, anthropology, particularly
paleoanthropology – the study of the evolution and development of human beings – has
remained largely out of its field of view. Certainly, up until rather recently, anthropology offered
rather few obvious connection points to adult education. Other than its important contribution of
ethnographic research methodologies (Malinowski, 1922; Radcliffe-Brown, 1933; Risjord, 2000)
that are sometimes adopted in adult education research (Taylor, Beck &Ainsworth, 2001),
anthropology’s exploration of culture – dominated by discussions of kinship networks,
descriptions of cultural artifacts, and depictions of primitive economies – seemed only weakly
connected to adult education’s interest in the effective engagement of adult learners. Its
investigations of human evolution, featuring dusty anthropologists haggling over the importance
of a few shards of bone or chips of stone, seemed to offer little help to adult educators concerned
with developing meaningful transformative learning contexts. In this paper, I propose that recent
developments in both in cultural anthropology and paleoanthropology are dramatically changing
the relevance of anthropology for adult education. This is particularly true in light of
simultaneous developments in our own field, especially our shifting sense of the situated and
intensely social nature of lifelong learning processes (Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991;
Wenger, 1999; Wilson, 1993). Now, instead of being arcane and irrelevant, anthropological
theory and empirical research have a great deal to offer adult educators interested in
understanding more about the distinctive nature and archaic origins of lifelong learning
processes.
The foray of Canadian neuroscientist, Merlin Donald (1991, 2001), into the field of
anthropology clearly reveals the potentials of interdisciplinary research for our own field. Of
course, Donald, himself, is deeply aware of the great challenges of interdisciplinary work.
Theorists working across several disciplines, he observes, are always in danger of glossing over
or oversimplifying complex notions that oftentimes require years of immersion in the discourses
of a discipline to appreciate. As Donald (2004) relates, “too often the label ‘interdisciplinary’
simply implies that a work so labeled lacks any discipline whatever” (p. 248). Still, when it
comes to understanding human cognition (and, I would argue by extension, lifelong learning), an
interdisciplinary approach is unavoidable. This, Donald insists, is because understanding human
cognition cannot be fully achieved from within the confines of cognitive psychology alone.
Understanding a process like lifelong learning requires us to come to grips with “three central
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facts:… the human mind is a dynamic process, whose realization is harnessed to the creative
structure of culture, and whose structure is solidly planted in brain physiology” (p. 256).
Donald theorizes that, although humans share key cognitive attributes of mammals and
essentially the same brain plan as primates, we have also evolved distinctive cognitive and
learning powers that are radically different than other animals. Our conscious perceptual
awareness, Donald suggests, is probably very much like other closely related primates (like
chimpanzees). One thing no other animal seems nearly as adept as us at, however, is what
Donald (2001) identifies as, “interlinking our attentional system with those of other people” (p.
255). Our capacity to link our minds together into a “distributed cognitive process,” he argues, is
based on a host of interrelated capacities that gradually evolved in humans over millions of years
(p. 274). Many of these capacities are fundamental properties of the primate brain (including
many of the perceptual, memory, and executive functions that enable all primates to creatively
inhabit complex environments). However, other species specific capacities – to make reciprocal
eye contact (babies display this very early), to harmonize our vocalizations and actions with
others, to imitate facial and body gestures, and so on – served as an additional basis for the
emergence and then rapid evolution of a radically different form of cognition in which, as
individuals, we weave our own consciousnesses into the shared fabric of culture. According to
Donald, “the human brain is a poor thing on its own, an inarticulate, undifferentiated,
metaphorizing beast like any other. But joined to a community of its fellows, it has this
remarkable capacity to create a community of mind, acquire symbolizing powers, and vastly
expand the range of its own awareness, in proportion to the depth of its enculturation” (p. 326).
The emergence of our human cognitive and learning capacities, Donald argues, did not occur
overnight. There was no single event in human evolution that suddenly made us capable of
sharing our cognitions. To help explain this, Donald (1991) draws on the broad resources of
paleoanthropology, particularly from a dramatically increasing number of fossils and artifacts
that disclose important information about the physical and cultural attributes of archaic
hominids, to paint a detailed picture of how our distinct cognitive capacities evolved. This, he
contends, took place in four phases. In the first phase, prior to the emergence of the genus homo
(just over two million years ago), our ancestors possessed cognitive capacities on par with many
other primates. Then, in the second phase, sometime within the next half million years, they
began to acquire increased capacities for social cohesion and cultural sharing. At the same time
as the brains of hominids began rapidly to increase in size, and at the same juncture that
increasingly sophisticated tools become prevalent in the fossil record, hominids begin to display
unmistakable signs of increased cultural integration (long-stay habitation sites, evidence of
cooperative tool-making, long-lasting cultural and tool-making traditions). Donald points out
that, while there is little evidence at this point that humans possessed vocal language, it is very
likely that they did possess a rich capacity for what he calls “mimesis,” the ability to share
cognition through mime, imitation, practice, and, eventually, gesture.
This laid the foundation for the emergence of language (in effect, an elaborate and powerful
form of gesturing) that propelled humans into even more intense distributed cognitive structures
(cultures). This third phase (Donald calls it the “mythic phase”) emerged about a half million
years ago. Again, it was accompanied by an increase in the size of certain parts of the brain
(although not a dramatic change in overall brain plan) to handle the demands of increasingly
complex social/cultural relations. It also coincided with another dramatic increase in human
cultural capacities. It was during this time, for instance, that advanced cultures enabled humans
to begin to inhabit a wide range of inhospitable environments.
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Finally, about 40,000 years ago, humans entered what Donald identifies as the forth
“theoretic” phase in which humans rapidly acquired the capacity to tap into extensive “external”
cultural systems. While it is difficult to discern any significant further evolution in the brain from
this point onward (evolution works much more slowly than this), it is evident from the
archeological record that dramatic transformations were occurring. According to Donald, the
rapid development of symbolic technologies (language, art, music, narrative, and writing)
enabled humans to dramatically extend both their individual and collective powers. By way of
enculturation, humans could access a vast store of collective knowledge that drew on the
experiences of other people, both living and dead (we still learn from Lao Tzu, for instance).
Donald’s account challenges many foundational assumptions that underpin the theories and
practices of adult education. Because we have drawn so exclusively in our field from the
cognitive sciences, we have almost entirely missed what Donald insists is the very thing that
makes humans unique. Cognitive science (and adult education in its wake), “studies the mind as
if it were confined entirely within a single brain.” Culture, when it is considered at all, is
included only as part of the environment of the isolated brain. “This mind-in-a-box belief is
accepted by Cartesians, Behaviorists, and Cognitivists alike.” It is so broadly present in our own
field that it is difficult even to image learning as something other than the “internalization of
information” (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Precisely because the distinguishing feature of human
evolution has been, as Donald colorfully describes, “The Great Hominid Escape from the
Nervous System,” we must admit many additional layers of complexity in order to understand
human learning. While humans still learn like the mammals we are, we also have developed
extensive capacities for mimetic, mythic and theoretic learning. Each of these forms of learning
reiterate a specific capacity for active, engaged and situated learning that we achieved at key
junctures in our species evolution.
Paleoanthropologist, Steven Mithen, provides much more that is extremely useful to adult
educators interested in the ways anthropology can help extend our understanding of adult
learning. In The Singing Neanderthals (2005), for instance, Mithen proposes that, during the long
phase of human evolution prior to spoken language identified by Donald as the “mimetic” phase,
humans communicated using a “holistic proto-language” which he colorfully identifies by the
acronym “Hmmmmm” (holistic, manipulative, multi-modal, musical and mimetic) (p. 172).
While Hmmmmm certainly included a vocal component, Mithen insists that it was a whole-body
form of communication that could include rhythmic movement, gesture, mime, vocalization, and
expression. Unlike modern language, which Mithen points out is highly referential and
conventional and functions, largely, to draw attention to fine distinctions in a shared social
environment, the purpose of Hmmmmm was much more to harmonize emotional and affective
states. Tightly associated with the evolution of a suite of other hominid characteristics like
bipedalism (not just for walking, but more importantly, for the rhythmic act of running) and the
development of increased capacity for vocal control (including greater enervation of the vocal
tract, the development of a thicker, better controlled tongue, and the development of fine control
of the diaphragm), Hmmmmm ‘utterances’ enabled early hominids (like Homo habilis, and their
descendents, Homo neanderthalis, as well as Homo ergaster) to achieve unprecedented social
cohesion and harmony. The exposure to Hmmmmm during infancy enabled ancient hominids to
develop capacities for understanding the feelings and points of view of other members of their
species. In Mithen’s words, it enabled hominids to acquire a sense of “we-ness” that had great
survival value, particularly as hominids expanded throughout the world and into environments so
very unlike the African environment in which humans developed their various physical
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attributes. Moreover, Mithin argues, Hmmmmm is not simply a phase we passed through on our
way to developing language. Rather, Hmmmmm still comprises a present and powerful
infrastructure that is essential to our experience of daily life. We have not left it behind us on our
way to developing more modern attributes. Just as Donald argues that our immediate sense of the
world is very much like other great apes (the world of our senses has the same raw feel), Mithen
argues that the vast layer of human bonding and interconnection that is established through our
earliest experiences of Hmmmmm (the coddling, sing-song, emotionally harmonizing rhythms of
early infancy) is the same as that experienced by ancient hominids. It was on the basis of
Hmmmmm that Homo neanderthalis developed their magnificent, nuanced culture that lasted,
unchanged, for tens of thousands of years.
Mithen’s great challenge to adult education, I would contend, is its extreme cognitivist bias.
Our understanding of cognition and learning is inordinately impacted by our focus on language
as a tool for transmitting information. Very seldom do adult educators acknowledge the vast
terrain of rhythms and harmonies that underlie our common social experience that are the very
substratum of our being able to be together and to share understandings. Mithen directs our
attention to an entire continent of human experience that is rarely considered in our field.
Mithen’s thoughtful examination of music combined with a careful review of anthropological
evidence reveals a very different view of cognition and learning as processes that are much better
described as a social and cultural process of collectively falling into rhythm and harmony (in our
actions, in our emotions, in our perceptions) than of transmitting information. Mithen’s
anthropological investigations have much to offer us as we strive to understand the nature of
situated learning and its place in adult education theory and practice.
The great relevance of anthropology to adult education is easily seen in the fascinating recent
work of primatologist, anthropologist and cultural psychologist, Michael Tomasello (1999;
2004). In his recent book, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (1999), Tomasello claims
that, at a crucial junction in human evolution, human beings acquired a crucial capacity that set
us apart from all other creatures, including our closest living primate relatives, the chimpanzee
and our recently extinct hominid relatives, Homo neanderthalis (Neanderthals co-existed with
Homo sapiens in Europe as recently as 20,000 years ago). According to Tomasello, the basis for
this distinction is our capacity to “share attention” with other members of our species which
enables humans “to pool their cognitive resources in ways that other animal species cannot” (p.
5). Unlike any other animal, human beings have the ability to “understand conspecifics as beings
like themselves who have intentional and mental lives like their own. This understanding enables
individuals to imagine themselves in ‘the mental shoes’ of some other person, so that they can
learn not just from the other but through the other” (p. 5-6). Importantly, for Tomasello, this
capacity, while founded in our evolutionary heritage, is not simply so. Our capacity to share
attention with each other is also, crucially, a result of our development in a specific “ontogenetic
niche” that generates potentials that otherwise are not expressed. So, for instance, while genetic
conditions that exist that impair the human ability for sharing attention, humans who do not
experience human culture in infancy also fail to develop the capacity for cultural learning. As a
result, Tomasello argues “Modern adult cognition of the human kind is the product not only of
genetic events taking place over many millions of years in evolutionary time but also of cultural
events taking place over many tens of thousands of years in historical time and personal events
taking place over many tens of thousands of hours in ontogenetic time” (p. 216). Our capacities
for, what Tomasello calls, “mind reading” enable us deliberately to teach and learn from each
other. As such, this distinct human capacity is what enables us to create culture, and then, in
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unending, intergenerational cycles, to incorporate and build upon the cultural accomplishments
of others.
This deeply cultural sense of the nature of lifelong learning is, I would argue, painfully
absent in the theories and practices of adult education. Instead, learning theory in adult education
(when it is considered at all) is too often based, at best, on outmoded and increasingly discredited
individualist cognitive learning theory, or even worse, on behaviorist theory. Tomasello’s work
opens a door for a much needed reconceptualization of lifelong learning in adult education as a
deeply cultural process.
While anthropologists who focus on the archaic emergence and primordial nature of human
learning capacities like Donald, Mithen and Tomasello afford adult educators a great opportunity
to critically examine the cognitivist bias of their learning theories, cultural anthropologists who
examine human learning processes in a variety of indigenous and non-Western contexts also
have much to add to our sense of our field. In my view, a particularly important potential
contributor to adult education is Tim Ingold whose groundbreaking book, Perception of the
Environment (2000), challenges long-standing conceptions of “knowledge” as something that
exists as an entity independent of our ongoing engagement in our world. Ingold’s detailed
examination of human practices in a host of indigenous cultures like wayfinding, basketweaving, tool-making, and communicating fully dispels the conception of humans as containers
for abstract “knowledge.” Rather, he reveals much about how knowledge is an inherent part of
our engagement with the world and with the lives of other people. Himself deeply impacted by
the early work of Jean Lave (1988), Ingold contends that learning is much better served by
metaphors like “weaving” or “dwelling,” which draw attention to the active, embodied, and
forever situated nature of human learning, than it is by the metaphor of the container or the
information processor. Instead of an ontology that presents human beings as rational subjects set
against an objective world, Ingold (drawing variously on Heidegger, Habermas and Lave) asserts
an ontology of engagement in which the subject already dwells in the world. Thinking and doing
are not two dichotomous aspects of being; in Ingold’s ontology, thinking is already a kind of
doing. Thus, as Heidegger relates, “we do not dwell because we have built, but we build and
have built because we dwell, this is because we are dwellers…. To build is in itself already to
dwell…. Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build” (1971, p.148, 146, 160).
According to Ingold (2000), “what this means is that the forms people build, whether in the
imagination or on the ground, arise within the current of their involved activity, in the specific
relational contexts of their practical engagement in their surroundings” (p. 186). We do not
import our plans or our thoughts into the world we build. Rather, imagining what one might
build is only possible because we already dwell in the world.
Ingold’s claim that humans are dwellers profoundly challenges the prevailing theory in adult
education that learning is a process of acquiring knowledge. Thinking, for dwellers, is not just a
process that transpires in the head; rather, it is better described as a phenomenon that emerges
when human beings entwine themselves in the unfolding processes of the world (the world is as
implicated in the emergence of this phenomena as is the person). Knowledge, likewise, is not a
separate body of propositions that can be internalized by the human subject. Instead, knowledge
for dwellers is the shape or the pattern of their engagement in the world. It is the way the
unfolding and emergent pattern that they are intersects and entwines with the surfaces and flows
of the world in which they dwell. At birth, each of us is thrown into a world already unfolding
into which we must weave our lives (and, in Tomasello’s account, this includes, significantly, a
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strong cultural component). It is through learning that we dwell in the world. Learning, in short,
is the way we twist the threads of our life into the ever-changing fabric of our world.
It is this kind of sophisticated thinking about learning, I contend, that adult education deeply
needs. For too long, our field has drawn too shallowly from too small a theoretical base. The
time has come for us to radically expand our interdisciplinary explorations to include a far wider
range of philosophical, scientific and social scientific material. Anthropology, in particular, is a
crucial realm of exploration, particularly at the current juncture when anthropologists are so
rapidly deepening their understanding of the relationship between humans and their social and
cultural contexts. The engagement of many contemporary anthropologists with concepts of deep
concern to adult educators like “knowledge” and “human learning” generates a powerful point of
connection that adult educators should diligently follow.
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